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Background: Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) remain an indispensable form of human experimentation as a
vehicle for discovery of new treatments. However, since their inception RCTs have raised ethical concerns. The
ethical tension has revolved around “duties to individuals” vs. “societal value” of RCTs. By asking current patients “to
sacrifice for the benefit of future patients” we risk subjugating our duties to patients’ best interest to the utilitarian
goal for the good of others. This tension creates a key dilemma: when is it rational, from the perspective of the trial
patients and researchers (as societal representatives of future patients), to enroll in RCTs?
Methods: We employed the trust version of the prisoner’s dilemma since interaction between the patient and
researcher in the setting of a clinical trial is inherently based on trust. We also took into account that the patient
may have regretted his/her decision to participate in the trial, while a researcher may feel guilty because he/she
abused the patient’s trust.
Results: We found that under typical circumstances of clinical research, most patients can be expected not to trust
researchers, and most researchers can be expected to abuse the patients’ trust. The most significant factor
determining trust was the success of experimental or standard treatments, respectively. The more that a researcher
believes the experimental treatment will be successful, the more incentive the researcher has to abuse trust. The
analysis was sensitive to the assumptions about the utilities related to success and failure of therapies that are
tested in RCTs. By varying all variables in the Monte Carlo analysis we found that, on average, the researcher can be
expected to honor a patient’s trust 41% of the time, while the patient is inclined to trust the researcher 69% of the
time. Under assumptions of our model, enrollment into RCTs represents a rational strategy that can meet both
patients’ and researchers’ interests simultaneously 19% of the time.
Conclusions: There is an inherent ethical dilemma in the conduct of RCTs. The factors that hamper full co-
operation between patients and researchers in the conduct of RCTs can be best addressed by: a) having more
reliable estimates on the probabilities that new vs. established treatments will be successful, b) improving
transparency in the clinical trial system to ensure fulfillment of “the social contract” between patients and
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Clinical trials, particularly randomized controlled trials
(RCTs), remain an indispensable form of human experi-
mentation as a vehicle for discovery of new treatments
[1]. However, since their inception, RCTs have raised
ethical concerns [2]. The ethical tension has revolved
around consideration of “duty to individuals” vs. “soci-
etal value” of RCTs [3,4]. By asking current (trial)
patients “to sacrifice for the benefit of future patients”
we risk subjugating our duty to consider our patients’
best interest to the utilitarian goal of potentially improv-
ing healthcare for the good of others [4,5].
Over the years, equally reasonable, yet vociferous argu-
ments have been made in support of maximizing out-
comes for trial patients as opposed to the benefits that
future patients will have via conducting testing in ad-
equately performed clinical trials [4]. The debate has,
however, crystallized one issue on which all parties
agree: in clinical research, particularly research that uses
a RCT design, there is interplay between common and
conflicting interest of two “players”—a researcher
(broadly considered as a representative of society) and a
patient. If we accept this premise, then viewed from this
perspective, the issue of patients’ enrollment into RCTs
(and advances in therapeutics) can be formulated in
terms of game theory with two “players” [6]: a patient
and a researcher. Game theory has evolved as a branch
of applied mathematics as the most suitable technique
to model situations that are fraught with conflict and co-
operation at the same time [6,7]. It assumes that people
act strategically to advance their interests [8]. The best
known example of strategic games is the so-called
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (see Section Prisoner’s
Dilemma). In its original form, this game is difficult to
apply in the context of RCTs [8] because, as discussed
below, it does not take trust into account, which is es-
sential for enrollment of patients into experimental clin-
ical trials characterized with hope-for-benefits and
unknown harms.
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Under which circumstances does it pay off to co-oper-
ate? The prisoner’s dilemma provides a mathematical so-
lution that addresses the question “when is it more
rational to defect vs. cooperate?” The most famous two-
person game got its name from the following hypothet-
ical situation: imagine two suspected criminals, Abe and
Bill, arrested and isolated for interrogation by the police.
Each of them is given an option: (1) testify against their
partner in crime (defect) (D); or (2) keep quiet (cooper-
ate with the partner) (C) and ask for a lawyer. Bill does
not know what Abe told the police and vice versa.
If only one of the them defects, he gets to walk away as
a free man with a $1000 reward, while the other goes tojail for 10 years. If both suspects defect (testify) they will
both go to jail for 5 years. On the other hand – if both
suspects cooperate with each other (ask for a lawyer) the
district attorney has no evidence of a major crime and
they both walk away free (but with no reward).
The interesting aspect of this situation is that collectively,
both suspects can walk away free if they keep quiet. But
strategically, here is what Abe is thinking: (i) if Bill keeps
quiet, I better testify in order to get the reward money, (ii)
if Bill testifies, I better testify too or I will get 10 years in-
stead of 5. Hence, they both testify and go to jail.
In the medical setting a similar hypothetical situation
can be constructed with a busy doctor and her patient.
Suppose that a patient comes in with a problem. The
doctor has two options: on one hand, he can perform a
cursory (5 minute) examination and provide the patient
with prescription. Or, the doctor can conduct a thor-
ough exam and give the patient a prescription and man-
agement advice after a detailed discussion of benefits
and risks of treatments (taking about 60 minutes). The
patient can choose to follow the advice and fill the pre-
scription, or to ignore the prescribed treatment and seek
a second opinion. There are four possible outcomes:
 (C, C): the doctor spends extra time and gives
advice; the patient follows the advice;
 (C, D): the doctor spends extra time and gives
advice; the patient seeks a second opinion;
 (D, C): the doctor spends only 5 minutes; the
patient fills the prescription;
 (D, D): the doctor spends only 5 minutes; the
patient seeks second opinion;
Again, the (C, C) is the best collective outcome. But
individually, the patient is better off by seeking a second
opinion (as another independent exam is typically best
the protection against frequent medical errors), which
gives the doctor an incentive to spend as little time on
any individual patient as possible and save time. These
choices lead to (D,D) as the most logical choice when
each “player” decides on their “best” strategy.
When patients enroll in clinical trials they are happy
to contribute to knowledge that can help future patients,
but, naturally, they also hope to help maximize their
own health outcomes [9]. In a similar vein, clinical
researchers are primarily motivated to undertake clinical
trials to help their own patients. However, these motiva-
tions are secondary because the purpose of research is
to help future patients [10]. In addition, the history of
clinical research is marred by abuses, which indicates
that researchers often put their interests ahead of their
patients [11-14]. Therefore, enrollment into clinical trials
is indeed fraught with common and conflicting interests
– those of patients and those of researchers.
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damentally based on trust [15-17]. In a number of papers,
Miller and colleagues argue that there is built-in tension be-
tween the goals and interests of researchers and patients
who volunteer for clinical trials [14,18-21]. In clinical trials,
particularly RCTs, there is an inherent potential for exploit-
ing research participants and abusing trust[14,18-21]; trust
is a precondition for human research [16,17].
An important condition for trust is that the truster
(i.e., patient) accepts some level of risk or vulnerability
[15,22]. If the patient does not believe that the re-
searcher will have her best interest at heart, she will
never consent to participate in a clinical trial. Once en-
rolled in the trial, the patient may discover that her trust
was abused [13,23], and will consequently regret that
she participated in the trial. Similarly, a researcher may
feel guilty because he did not honor the patient’s trust.
In this paper, we employed the trust version of the
prisoner’s dilemma game [24] to address the central
quandary in clinical research: when is it rational, from
the perspective of trial patients and researchers (as soci-
etal representatives of future patients), to enroll in clin-
ical trials, particularly in RCTs [4]?
Methods
Model
A dilemma whether to enroll in an experimental trial vs.
opting for more established treatments can come in the
various alternatives. Sometimes, patients themselves may
insist on receiving hoped-for but inadequately tested and
potentially harmful experimental treatments [25,26]. How-
ever, obtaining such treatments would be difficult without
the cooperation of a researcher/physician who would need















Figure 1 Model of clinical research according to the trust version of t
e-success of experimental treatment; s-success of standard treatments. R-re
success or failure; V1-V4: the researcher’s utilities related to treatment succe
treatment NA- not applicable (see text for details).clinical trial at the potential risk of professional and per-
sonal liability. In addition, these treatments are rigorously
controlled by the regulatory agencies such as the Food and
Drug Administration [27]. The dilemma can present in the
context of participating in phase I, II or III trials. Therefore,
one can potentially create many models depending on the
specifics of the situation for an individual patient and/or a
researcher. We choose to illustrate a dilemma facing inves-
tigators and patients by highlighting tension that is com-
monly encountered in clinical research: should a
researcher offer a new, experimental treatment within the
context of an RCT, or should he/she offer this promising
treatment that is unproven, yet available, outside of the
trial [28]? Figure 1 illustrates our model. We believe that
the model captures most generic clinical research situa-
tions and certainly those that have provoked extensive
writings in the medical and ethical literature. [2,29-31]
Although some authors disagree [19,21], most ethicists
and clinicians believe that scientific and ethical standards
require that a researcher should enroll a patient into a RCT
only if there is equipoise, i.e., the honest state of epistemo-
logical uncertainty [4,32-39]. When there is such uncer-
tainty, the researchers have ethical and professional
obligations to honestly share it with their patients, and as a
consequence offer treatment only in the context of RCTs
[36-43]. Since no treatment is always successful, we assume
that there is a certain probability of success of experimental
(e) and standard treatment (s). The probability of
randomization is denoted as r in the model. The inset in
the Figure 1 represents a model of the classic equipoise
model. It should be noted that the ethics of equipoise pre-
dominantly focus on the situations when the patient is
already considered for enrollment in a RCT: discussion
























he prisoner’s game dilemma. The inset shows the equipoise model;
gret; G-guilt; U1 to U4: the patient’s utilities related to treatment
ss or failure; Exp Rx- experimental treatment; Std Rx- standard
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model, the differences in the potential values that patients
and researchers may have related to outcomes obtained in
a RCT are rarely discussed [39,47]. In fact, it is typically im-
plicitly assumed that researchers’ and patients’ interests are
aligned. As a result, and unlike in the proposed trust model
(see below), patients and researchers utilities in the equi-
poise model can be considered equivalent.
However, many researchers strongly believe that one
treatment – typically the new one – is superior to the other,
and are inclined to offer this treatment directly to their
patients, particularly if such a treatment is already available,
as for example through the process of the FDA accelerated
approval [48,49], or through the regularly approved drugs
but for different indications (in so called “off-label” use).
Researchers may lean toward offering experimental treat-
ment outside of the trial if they invested considerable effort
in helping to develop it. This, however, may lead to direct
conflict between the interests of the researcher and his pa-
tient [50,51](middle branch in Figure 1). Not surprisingly,
researchers’ conflicts of interests – real or perceived– and
the well-documented cases of abuse of clinical trial volun-
teers [13,52], have resulted in alarming publications in the
lay press about the use of humans as “guinea pigs” solely
for the purpose of advancing science and scientific careers
[53]. However, the nature of experimental studies is such
that the patients cannot be guaranteed successful outcome
with any treatment [4,32]. Hence, as outlined in the Intro-
duction, clinical trials, like any other clinical encounter, are
inherently based on trust [15]. Analogous to the lack of
guaranteed outcomes, patients cannot be guaranteed in ad-
vance that their trust will not be abused. The probability
that trust will be honored is denoted as “p” in the model.
Hence, if a patient does not believe that her best interests
are not the primary focus of her physician-investigator, she
will never consent to participation in a clinical trial. As a
consequence, the patient will request established, standard
treatment (the lower branch in the model). (NB the model
does not distinguish between a researcher’s honest beliefs
that “his” experimental treatment is superior to standard
therapy from his conscious or subconscious bias in favor of
experimental therapy. The model does, however, implicitly
assume that if p=0, the researcher always believes that the
experimental treatment is better than standard treatment).
However, after the patient is enrolled in the trial, she
may discover that her trust was abused. Consequently,
the patient will regret having volunteered participation
in the trial. Regret (R) is defined as a fraction of the dif-
ference between the utility of the best action taken and
the utility of the outcome we should have taken, in
retrospect [54-56]. In this model, we expressed regret as
a fraction of the loss of potential utilities [24]. Although
regret under the scenarios of “Do Not Trust” and
“Abuse Trust” is likely different, we kept the scenariosidentical in our model for simplification purposes. Simi-
larly, a researcher may feel guilty (G) because he abused
the patient’s trust. Guilt expresses the psychological re-
action of a researcher abusing the trust of the patient.
The guilt diminishes the researcher’s utility by a fraction
of the difference between the researcher’s and the
patient’s utilities under the “Honor Trust” vs. “Abuse
Trust” scenarios” in Figure 1 [24].
Each of the alternative courses of action shown in Fig-
ure 1 is associated with the payoffs (utilities). The util-
ities are likely different between the patients (U) and
researchers (V). If the utilities are the same, then the
prisoner’s dilemma model does not apply. In fact, in the
case of the scenario shown in the inset, the tree reduces
to the equipoise model discussed above. In our trust
model we assumed that U1 ≥U3 ≥U2, U4 and V1 ≥V2,
V3 ≥V4. We assumed that utilities associated with treat-
ment success must be higher than those related to treat-
ment failure. We also assume that V2 ≥U2 since society
benefits from knowledge obtained even in cases of un-
successful testing (e.g., such knowledge helps to avoid
administration of the unsuccessful treatments to future
patients, and to allocate resources to the development of
other therapies that look more promising, etc.). Finally,
we assumed that the “game” can be played only once, i.
e., the same patient will not be enrolled in more than
one trial. Although some patients can indeed be invited
to participate in more than one trial, in contemporary
clinical research practice, the vast majority of patients
are enrolled in one trial only.
Data
A few published studies have addressed the question of
the probability of success of experimental vs. established,
standard treatments [57]. In the largest study to date,
which synthesized data from RCTs performed over
50 years in the field of cancer, we found that the overall
probability of success of experimental vs. standard treat-
ments was 41% vs. 59%, respectively [58]. Similar results
were reported in other fields [59]. These data support
the theoretical requirement for equipoise before offering
enrollment into RCTs, and indicate that, regardless of
the field, disease or a type of interventions, the probabil-
ity of success of new vs. established treatment should be
about 50:50, which is what we assumed in the equipoise
model (see the inset, Figure 1)[4,32,60,61] Empirical
studies showed that fewer than 3% of patients would
accept randomization if the probability of success of one
treatment over another exceeded 80% [62,63]. Hence, we
varied the values describing treatment success in our
trust model (variables e and s, respectively) over the 20-
80% range (Table 1). The model assumes that both
patients and researchers are more interested in the
therapeutic “success” of treatment (i.e., whether
Table 1 Data




95 (80–100) 90 (50–100)
Assumed 100(1) in
the equipoise model (inset)








54 (10–100) 16.3 (0–50)
Assumed 0 in the
equipoise model (inset)








70 (40–80) 84 (50–1100)
Assumed 100 (1) in the
equipoise model (inset)








44 (0–80) 16.9 (0–50)
Assumed 0 in the equipoise
model (inset)
























Failure of standard treatment 1-s
Randomization (r) 0.5 (0.2-0.8)
(0.5 for the equipoise model)
(MC modeling: triangular
distribution)







# - sensitivity analysis was performed for the values shown in Table but also for all extreme values (0–1)- the change in the assumptions did not affect the results
of the analysis; $- based on the survey of 8 clinical investigators; * assumed to be the same within and outside of the trial; MC- Monte Carlo; **- actual values
based on reference [41] is 0.41 (0.37-0.45) for experimental and 0.59 (0.55-0.62) for standard treatment, respectively ***-based on the reference [41].
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ment and vice versa) than in knowing the precise
magnitude of treatment itself in terms of hazard ratio,
relative risk, etc.
No empirical data exist that can precisely inform
the values of each of the utilities in our model.
Therefore, we surveyed a convenience sample of 8
experienced clinical investigators, asking them to pro-
vide the values for each of utilities shown in Figure 1,
first from a patient and then from a researcher per-
spective. Since the values did not substantially differ
for the utilities of treatment success and failure
within and outside of the clinical trial, respectively,
we further simplified the model by using the same
values for utilities for each of these scenarios shown
in Figure 1. Table 1 shows the summary of the util-
ities based on this survey with a wide range of the
values in sensitivity analysis. By making the ranges
wide, the lack of empirical data becomes a less im-
portant issue since the results informed by putative
empirical information would most likely fit within the
range of our analysis (see Results).
Analysis
We first identified ranges for the variables for which
the best strategy for the patient is to trust or not to
trust a researcher, and the researcher to have incen-
tive to honor or abuse the patient’s trust. We comple-
mented this analysis by employing the Monte-Carlo
modeling technique, varying all variables over the
values shown in Table 1. We ran the analysis for
100,000 trials. The latter analyses were performed
using the Microsoft EXCEL software.
Results
1. The equipoise model
Assuming that the utilities and probabilities between
experimental and standard treatments are equal, as the-
oretically predicted [4,32] (Table 1), the solution of the





The equipoise model, thus, indicates that the most ra-
tional solution for a researcher to offer and for a patient to
accept randomization occurs at the probability of 50%.
2. The trust model
We solved the entire tree shown in Figure 1 both from
the researchers’ and patient’s point of view.a) From the researcher’s point of view:
The expected value of “Honor Trust” and enroll the
patient in a RCT is given as :
E Honor½  ¼ rEV Exp½  þ 1 rð ÞEV Std½ 
E Abuse½  ¼ eV1 þ 1 eð Þ V2  G  V2  U2j jð Þ
¼ EV Exp½   1 eð ÞG  V2  U2ð Þ
where EV [Exp] and EV [Std] are the expected value, to the
researcher, of the experimental and standard treatment,
respectively.
Therefore, the expected value of “Honor Trust” is
larger than the expected value of “Abuse Trust” if:
E Honor½ ≥E Abuse½ 
rEV Exp½  þ 1 rð ÞEV Std½ ≥EV Exp½   1 eð ÞG  V2  U2ð Þ
r EV Exp½   EV Std½ ð Þ≥EV Exp½   EV Std½   1 eð ÞG  V2  U2ð
If EV [Exp]≥EV [Std], the inequality above means that
the researcher will have a higher expected value of honor-
ing trust if
r≥1 1 eð ÞG  V2  U2ð Þ
EV Exp½   EV Std½ 
On the other hand, if EV [Exp]<EV [Std], the inequal-
ity above means that the researcher will have higher
expected value of honoring trust if
r < 1 1 eð ÞG  V2  U2ð Þ
EV Exp½   EV Std½ 
b) From the patient’s point of view
The expected value of “Do Not Trust” is straightforward:
E No Trust½  ¼ sU3 þ 1 sð Þ U4  R U1  U4ð Þð Þ
¼ EU Std½   1 sð ÞR U1  U4ð Þ
The expected value of trust is equal to
E TrustjHonor½  ¼ rEU Exp½  þ 1 rð ÞEU Std½ 
E TrustjAbuse½  ¼ eU1 þ 1 eð Þ U2  R U3  U2ð Þð Þ
¼ EU Exp½   1 eð ÞR U3  U2ð Þ
where EU [Exp] and EU [Std] are the expected value of the ex-
perimental and standard treatment, respectively, for a patient.
If p is the percentage of times (or estimated subjective
probability) that the researcher honors trust (i.e. to act
in the patient’s best interest by offering her enrollment
into an RCT), the expected value of “Trust” is:
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EU Exp½   1 eð ÞR U3 U2ð Þð Þ
¼ prEU Exp½  þ p 1 rð ÞEU Std½  þ 1 pð ÞEU Exp½ 
 1 pð Þ 1 eð ÞR U3 U2ð Þ
¼ EU Exp½  þ p 1 rð Þ EU Std½   EU Exp½ ð Þ
 1 pð Þ 1 eð ÞR U3  U2ð Þ
¼ p 1 rð Þ EU Std½   EU Exp½ ð Þ þ p 1 eð Þ
R U3  U2ð Þ þ EU Exp½   1 eð ÞR U3 U2ð Þ
¼ p 1 rð Þ EU Std½   EU Exp½ ð Þ þ 1 eð ÞR U3  U2ð Þð Þ
þEU Exp½   1 eð ÞR U3 U2ð Þ
Therefore, E[Trust]≥ E[No Trust] if
p 1 rð Þ EU Std½   EU Exp½ ð Þ þ 1 eð ÞR U3  U2ð Þð Þ
þEU Exp½   1 eð ÞR U3  U2ð Þ≥EU Std½   1 sð ÞR U1 U4ð Þ
The solution of the tree under the baseline values shown
in Table 1 produced a disconcerting result: the most rational
behavior for the patient is to not trust and to not enroll in
the RCT [Expected value (EVtrust) = 45 vs. EVno_trust = 50].
From the researcher’s point of view, the strategy with the
highest expected utility was associated with “Abuse Trust”
Expected value(EVhonor_trust) = 65 vs. EVabuse_trust = 66].
The analysis was sensitive to most assumptions
about the utilities related to the success and failure of
therapies that are tested in RCTs. Figure 2 displays
the results of the patient’s and researcher’s strategy


















Figure 2 Two-way sensitivity analysis of the prisoner’s dilemma trust
success on: a) the patient’s trust of the researcher (whether to enroll in the
the two strategies are identical. The dot shows the baseline values of the mand standard treatments. Under the baseline assumption
of the model, the most rational strategy for the patient is
not to trust and for the researcher to abuse this trust. It
can also be seen that the higher the probability that the
experimental treatment will be successful, the more incen-
tive the researcher has to abuse the patient’s trust. How-
ever, for the wide range of success of experimental
treatments, the most rational strategy is still for the pa-
tient to trust, despite the possibility that the researcher
may not honor it: the likelihood of obtaining successful
treatment appears to justify putting oneself in a vulner-
able position. Figure 3 shows the two-way sensitivity
analysis for p (probability that the researcher will honor
trust) vs. r (probability of randomization). Under typical
randomization of 50%, in the trust model, unlike in the
equipoise model, the most rational strategy for the re-
searcher and patient is not to cooperate. The researcher
has incentive to honor trust only when the probability
that a patient’s chance of being randomized to the ex-
perimental treatment is ≥61%. On the other hand, the
patient should rationally exercise his/her trust only if the
probability that the researcher will honor the trust is
≥67%. We also observed two other interesting results:
under our assumption that regret is not greater than
guilt, neither the patient’s regret nor the researcher’s po-
tential guilt affected the analysis. In addition, the results
were not affected by the patient’s utility related to the
success of experimental treatment (it would have to be
>100% in order to override any patient’s concern about
trustworthiness of the researcher) (Results not shown).cess of Experimental Rx)
Researcher to abuse trust 
o honor trust
Researcher to abuse trust
Patient to trust
 trust
Patient not to trust
game of clinical trials. The effect of the probability of treatment
trial), b) researcher’s inclination to honor the trust. At the intersection,
odel. Color fields indicate the optimal strategy for each player.

















Researcher to abuse trust 
Researcher to abuse trust 
  Patient to trust
Researcher to honor trust 
Patient not to trust
Patient not to trust
Figure 3 Two-way sensitivity analysis of the prisoner’s dilemma trust game of clinical trials. The effect of the probability of randomization to
a particular treatment and the probability that the researcher will honor the trust on: a) patient’s trust whether to enroll in the trial, b) the
researcher’s inclination to honor the trust. The dot shows the baseline values of the model. Color fields indicate the optimal strategy for each
player.
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By varying all variables in the Monte Carlo analysis we
found that patients are inclined to trust researchers, and
that researchers honor that trust in only 19% of trials
(Table 2). That is, under the assumptions of our model,
enrollment into an RCT represents a rational strategy that
can meet both patients’ and researchers’ interests simul-
taneously 19% of the time. On average, the researcher can
be expected to honor trust 41% of the time, while the pa-
tient is inclined to trust the researcher 69% of the time.
Discussion
In this paper, we used the game theory approach to
model the clinical trial encounter. Given that the clinical
trial interaction, as with any other medical interaction, is
inherently based on trust, i.e., represents a bona fide re-
lation between a patient and a researcher, we employed
the trust version of the prisoner’s game dilemma [24].
This approach is based on the “risk-assessment views” ofTable 2 Trust Game: Results of Monte-Carlo Analysis
Trials Patient
(100,000)
Trust No Trust TOTAL
18867 21911 40778
Honor (18.9%) (21.9%) (40.8%)
Research 50014 9208 59222
Abuse (50.0%) (9.2%) (50.2%)
68881 31119 100,000
TOTAL (68.9%) (31.1%) (100%)trust, in which trusting is rational under certain condi-
tions that are expected not to lead to the betrayal of our
trust [15,22]. This view stresses the importance of having
reliable evidence about conditions in which we find our-
selves when we deliberate about whether to accept some
level of risk or vulnerability when we place our well-
being in the hands of others [15,22]. Trust is an epi-
stemic cause – we cannot simply want to trust without
an evidentiary basis justifying it [15,22].
Under the baseline conditions of our model, our ana-
lysis generated an unsettling finding: both patient’s and
researcher’s expected utility value was the highest for the
scenario “Do not trust” and “Abuse trust”, respectively.
This finding holds out despite the fact that the difference
between two strategies in terms of the numerical results
was rather minimal (see Results). This is because from a
decision-analytic point of view, we should choose the
strategy most likely to give us the best outcome, regard-
less of whether we believe it will be superior 51% or 99%
of the time [64]. Thus, from the individual point of
view, in trying to decide whether to enroll in a single
trial, the most rational behavior is not to cooperate. It is
possible that this type of behavior can explain the low
rate of enrollment into clinical trials. For example, fewer
than 3% of patients eligible for participation in clinical
trials enroll in them [65].
We were surprised to find out that over the wide
range of assumptions, the probability of randomization
plays a relatively smaller role than anticipated and
becomes important only when it exceeds 61% (Figure 1).
This is in contrast to the equipoise model (Figure 1, inset)
where 50% of randomization represents the right value,
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with the theory of rational choice [4]. These findings indi-
cating that randomization itself may be less ethically im-
portant than previously recognized are interesting in light
of vociferous debate about the role of randomization in
human experimentation [2,29,30,44, 66]. The reason for
the shift can be best understood by inspecting Figure 1:
the key decision related to participation in research begins
with the assessment of how effective current “standard”
treatments are [31]. Depending on the assessment of in-
formation related to the effects of established treatments,
the patient will decide whether to consider enrollment
into a clinical trial. Therefore, having reliable evidence on
the benefits and risks of the currently available treatments
becomes critical not only for the practice of medicine but
for participation in clinical trials – the importance of this
knowledge has long been stressed by the proponents of
the evidence-based medicine movement [40,41,67,68]. In-
deed, the assessment of the probability of success of ex-
perimental vs. standard treatment proved to be a much
more important variable in our model, both for the patient
and the researcher (Figure 3). In 1995, Chalmers called for
reliable estimates of the probabilities of treatment success
as the key ethical requirement for enrollment into RCTs
[57]. To date, a few systematic analyses have been per-
formed on this important topic. In the largest study to
date [58], we estimated the probability of success of new,
innovative vs. established treatments, which was some-
what dependent on the type of metrics used. Using a
meta-analytic technique, we estimated that the probabil-
ities of success of experimental vs. standard treatments
are about equal, 50%:50%. In the analysis reported in this
paper, we employed the 41% vs. 59% figure, which was
based on the global researchers’ assessment of the super-
iority of treatments [58] (See Table 1). Under assumption
of the baseline success rate of 59%:41%, the most rational
behavior is not to cooperate. Under the assumption of a
50%:50% success rate, the patient’s rational behavior is to
trust the researcher, while the researcher has incentive to
dishonor the patient’s trust (Figure 2). It is interesting that
we can expect full cooperation only in situations where
the expected success rates of experimental and standard
treatment are low (Figure 2). In all other situations, condi-
tions are created for either the patient not to trust or the
researcher to abuse the trust.
A number of historical abuses of patients who volun-
teered as research participants has contributed to the ero-
sion of trust in medical profession [13,23], and they
provide empirical justification for our model. The situ-
ation can be improved by cultivating trust and enforcing
the social contract view of trust [15-17,69]. This should be
the goal of oversight policies, including the requirement
for mandatory training in human subject research, redu-
cing conflicts of interest, etc. One way to minimizepotential abuses on the part of researchers is to enforce
norms of expected behavior [15,70]. These policies should
be coupled with more transparency in human clinical re-
search, and with obtaining better evidence on the actual
benefit and risks of participating in research. These mea-
sures would go a long way to boosting patients’ trust in
the system and ultimately lead to higher levels of partici-
pation in clinical research. The goal would be to align
patients’ and researchers’ interests. This alignment would
ultimately create conditions that promote the spirit of co-
operation, in which participation in clinical investigations
is viewed as a critical way to support this important public
good. These conditions should also support the idea that
we all have a duty to participate in research, unless there
is a good reason not to [71].
Our model has some limitations. First, we considered
only one type of clinical scenario. As explained above, it is
possible to model many other scenarios. Nevertheless, we
believe we chose the most typical clinical research situation,
making our model relevant to most ethicists and clinical
scientists. Second, we lack empirical data on most of the
variables used in the model, particularly on the patients’
utilities. However, we used a wide range for the values in
our analysis, which almost certainly would include such pu-
tative empirical data should they be obtained. We also
think this type of research would be very difficult to subject
to empirical testing, and modeling is the probably the best
approach we will ever have to tackle the important ethical
issue presented in this paper. This is particularly true since
most researchers would have difficulty admitting guilt asso-
ciated with the abuse of the patient’s trust. Similarly, it
would be difficult to measure the patient’s regret, although
our model indicates the lack of its importance. It is still,
however, possible that focusing on regret associated with
the process [72,73] rather than outcomes, as we did, could
make the role of regret more important than our results in-
dicate. Third, we employed a relatively narrow view of the
trust-risk assessment model. Thus, our model lacks a
broader societal perspective and integration of other im-
portant elements of trust such as virtue, goodwill or moral
integrity [15]. We think this is important, but building such
a model would be immensely more complicated, and is be-
yond of the scope of this paper.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we found that under the majority of typical
circumstances in clinical research today, most patients can
be expected not to trust researchers, and most researchers
can be expected to abuse the patients’ trust. The situation
can be improved by: a) having more reliable estimates of
the probability that a new treatment will be more success-
ful than an established treatment, b) improving transpar-
ency in the clinical trial system, c) enforcing “the social
contract” [69] between patients and researchers by
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mandating continuing training in human subject research.
These efforts will likely lead to decreases in the well-
documented abuses in clinical research while improving
participation in clinical trials.
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